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INTRODUCTION 
 
As far as international legal questions go, torture is an easy one. The prohibition of 
torture is one of the least controversial aspects of international human rights law and, 
indeed, of international law itself. For as long as human rights have been a feature of 
the international legal system, torture has been outlawed. Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948 declares, eloquently and categorically, “No one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”1 Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (“ICCPR”) repeats the prohibition and gives it further force by providing, in art 
4(2), that no derogation from the prohibition is permissible even in time of public 
emergency.2 
 
 
With the Convention against Torture 1984 (“CAT”), states reaffirmed and 
expanded upon the international legal prohibition on torture and created a treaty-
monitoring body, the Committee against Torture, to enforce the new agreement. The 
treaty’s first three articles are especially important. Article 1(1) defines torture as:  
 
…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from 
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity… 
 
Article 2(1) requires states parties to “take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction.” This provision is remarkable for expressly recruiting state judiciaries 
into the fight against torture. Article 2(2) makes undeniable what was already clear 
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in the previous international instruments: “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Finally, art 3(1) 
follows the logic of the international prohibition of torture to its natural conclusion 
by affirming that “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The CAT has 154 states parties, 
including Canada, which ratified it in 1987.3 
 
 
 The international prohibition of torture is thus a central and indisputable 
aspect of international human rights law. As was famously observed by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit in Filártiga v Peña-Irala, “the torturer has 
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an 
enemy of all mankind.”4 The prohibition is clearly conventional, but also customary. 
Indeed, it must surely be a norm of jus cogens. To test that assertion, one need only 
ask oneself, could two states lawfully conclude a treaty in which each agrees to 
permit the other to torture THEIR nationals? The answer is obvious: such a treaty 
would not be a treaty at all.  
 
 
 In deflating contrast to the startling clarity of international law on the 
illegality of torture, the recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada on the 
topic is marked by misunderstanding, wilful blindness and even recalcitrance. In the 
last thirty years or so the Court (mostly in obiter) has gone from strongly opposing 
torture (including refoulement), to potentially permitting refoulement and upholding 
legislation that allowed it, to ignoring what must surely be the most notorious case of 
Canadian complicity in torture in our legal history. In this paper I do not attempt to 
explain the Supreme Court of Canada’s regression from compliance to parochialism, 
from enlightenment to obscurity, for I do not understand it myself. My purpose is not 
to explain but to expose, in the hope that (as Justice Brandeis once said) sunlight will 
prove the best of disinfectants. 
 
 
EARLY SUPREME COURT OF CANADA JURISPRUDENCE ON 
TORTURE 
 
The first consideration of the international prohibition of torture by the Supreme 
Court of Canada came in an extradition case, Canada v Schmidt.5 Ms Schmidt was a 
Canadian citizen resisting extradition to the United States on a charge of child 
3 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA Res 
39/46, UNGAOR, 1984, Supp No 93, UN Doc A/Res/39/36. 
4 Filártiga v Peña-Irala, 630 F 2d 876 (2d Cir 1980) at 890. 
5 Canada v Schmidt, [1987] 1 SCR 500 [Schmidt]. 
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stealing contrary to Ohio law. She argued that she had been acquitted of the charge 
of kidnapping for the same offence under federal US law, and, therefore, to face 
extradition on the Ohio charge violated her ss 7 and 11(h) Charter rights, as well as 
the provisions of the Canada-US Extradition Treaty. Schmidt’s defence was rejected 
by the courts below and by the Supreme Court of Canada. La Forest J, for the 
majority of the Court, made the following observations about the application of the 
Charter to extradition:  
 
 I should at the outset say that the surrender of a fugitive to a 
foreign country is subject to Charter scrutiny notwithstanding that such 
surrender primarily involves the exercise of executive discretion. In 
Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, Dickson J 
(now C.J) made it clear that “the executive branch of the Canadian 
government is duty bound to act in accordance with the dictates of the 
Charter” (p. 455) and that even “disputes of a political or foreign policy 
nature may be properly cognizable by the courts” (p. 459); see also Wilson 
J at p. 464. 
 I have no doubt either that in some circumstances the manner in 
which the foreign state will deal with the fugitive on surrender, whether 
that course of conduct is justifiable or not under the law of that country, 
may be such that it would violate the principles of fundamental justice to 
surrender an accused under those circumstances. To make the point, I need 
only refer to a case that arose before the European Commission on Human 
Rights, Altun v. Germany (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 611, where it was 
established that prosecution in the requesting country might involve the 
infliction of torture. Situations falling far short of this may well arise 
where the nature of the criminal procedures or penalties in a foreign 
country sufficiently shocks the conscience as to make a decision to 
surrender a fugitive for trial there one that breaches the principles of 
fundamental justice enshrined in s. 7. I might say, however, that in most 
cases, at least, judicial intervention should await the exercise of executive 
discretion. For the decision to surrender is that of the executive authorities, 
not the courts, and it should not be lightly assumed that they will overlook 
their duty to obey constitutional norms by surrendering an individual to a 
foreign country under circumstances where doing so would be 
fundamentally unjust.6 
 
The Altun case7, approved by La Forest J, was a European Commission decision 
holding that the surrender of a fugitive to a country in which he is in danger of being 
subjected to torture is prohibited by art 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 1950.8 Article 3 is almost word-for-word the same as art 5 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights 1948. It reads: “No one shall be subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
 
 
6 Ibid at 521-22. 
7 Altun v Germany (1983), 5 EHRR 611. 
8 European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, Rome, 4.XI.1950. 
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 What is important about Schmidt for the purposes of this paper is La Forest 
J’s view that there may be cases in which surrendering a fugitive to a requesting state 
would be prohibited by s 7 of the Charter based on the foreign state’s expected 
treatment of the fugitive. One such case is where the requesting state may inflict 
torture on the surrendered person. It is not the foreign state’s conduct that is being 
scrutinized under the Charter, of course, but Canada’s decision to extradite the 
fugitive to such conduct. La Forest J’s observations on refoulement to torture in 
Schmidt are, of course, obiter. They are nevertheless the considered view of a 
renowned jurist, and attracted the support of the majority of the Court. 
 
  
 The Supreme Court of Canada’s next consideration of torture and 
international law came in Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice).9 Kindler had been 
found guilty of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping in 
Pennsylvania, where the jury recommended the death penalty. Before his sentencing, 
Kindler escaped from prison and fled to Canada. He was arrested and the US sought 
his extradition. The extradition judge allowed the application and committed Kindler 
to custody. The Minister of Justice then ordered his extradition without seeking 
assurances from the US, under art 6 of the Canada-US Extradition Treaty, that the 
death penalty would not be imposed or carried out. Kindler challenged the Minister’s 
refusal to seek such assurances under ss 7 and 12 of the Charter. The lower courts 
dismissed Kindler’s application. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada did 
likewise in reasons by McLachlin J (L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ concurring) 
and La Forest J (L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ again concurring). 
 
 
 McLachlin J (as she then was) held that there was no Charter violation in 
Parliament’s conferral upon the Minister of a discretion as to whether or not to seek 
death penalty assurances from the US (as permitted under the Extradition Treaty) 
and that there was no error in the Minister’s decision not to do so in Kindler’s case. 
In the course of her reasons, she made the following Schmidt-like observation about 
extradition to torture:  
 
When an accused person is to be tried in Canada there will be no conflict 
between our desire to see an accused face justice, and our desire that the 
justice he or she faces conforms to the most exacting standards which have 
emerged from our judicial system. However, when a fugitive must face 
trial in a foreign jurisdiction if he or she is to face trial at all, the two 
desires may come into conflict. In some cases the social consensus may 
clearly favour one of these values above the other, and the resolution of 
the conflict will be straightforward. This would be the case if, for instance, 
the fugitive faced torture on return to his or her home country.10 
 
9 Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice), 1991 SCC 70, [1991] 2 SCR 779 [Kindler]. There was a 
companion appeal for Kindler–Reference Re Ng Extradition (Can), [1991] 2 SCR 858. 
10 Kindler, ibid at 851. 
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McLachlin J went on to observe that there was no such social consensus in Canada 
that capital punishment is morally abhorrent and absolutely unacceptable11—the 
implication being that refoulement to torture is contrary to the Charter but 
refoulement to the death penalty is not. 
 
 
 La Forest J expressed his substantial agreement with McLachlin J while 
adding observations of his own, including the following observations contrasting 
torture to the death penalty: 
 
There are, of course, situations where the punishment imposed following 
surrender—torture, for example—would be so outrageous to the values of 
the Canadian community that the surrender would be unacceptable. But I 
do not think the surrender of fugitives who may ultimately face the death 
penalty abroad would in all cases shock the conscience of Canadians. My 
colleague, Cory J, refers to the free votes taken in the House of Commons 
in 1976 and 1987 rejecting the reinstatement of the death penalty as 
evidencing a “basic abhorrence” for the death penalty and providing “a 
clear indication that capital punishment is considered to be contrary to 
basic Canadian values” (p. 812). However, the fact that only four years 
ago, reinstatement of the death penalty was voted down by the relatively 
narrow margin of 148 to 127 attests to the contrary. As Marceau JA. states 
in his judgment in the Federal Court of Appeal, [1989] 2 F.C. 492, that a 
vote was even taken on the issue suggests that capital punishment is not 
viewed as an outrage to the public conscience. One could not imagine a 
similar vote on the question of whether to reinstate torture…. 
 
There are also a number of major international agreements mentioned by 
Cory J supporting the trend for abolition [of the death penalty] but, except 
for the Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of 
the Death Penalty, Europ. T.S. No 114, all fall short of actually 
prohibiting use of the death penalty. This contrasts with the overwhelming 
universal condemnation that has been directed at practices such as 
genocide, slavery and torture; cf., for example, Articles 6 and 7 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 172.12 
 
In these passages La Forest J identifies torture as a universally condemned practice 
and an obvious example of foreign state conduct that would justify Charter 
intervention in the extradition process. In saying so, La Forest J is effectively 
reaffirming his observations in Schmidt and concurring with McLachlin J in the case 
before the Court. Both judges appear to agree that torture is such an outrageous 
crime that any proposed extradition of a fugitive to face it would be unconstitutional. 
While neither Schmidt nor Kindler refers to the prohibition of refoulement to torture 
in art 3(1) of the CAT, both decisions are consistent with that obligation. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid at 832-33. 
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SURESH 
 
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)13 was the first case 
before the Supreme Court of Canada in which the international prohibition of torture 
was directly in issue. The main question was whether s 53(1)(b) of the Immigration 
Act14, effectively a statutory exception to the international prohibition of refoulement 
to torture, was constitutional. Section 53(1)(b) permitted the federal government to 
remove a person from Canada to a country where his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened if that person was a member of an inadmissible class (including persons 
who there are reasonable grounds to believe are members of an organization that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe will engage in terrorism) and the Minister 
was of the opinion that the person constituted a danger to the security of Canada.15 
The federal government alleged that the appellant, Suresh, was a member of and 
fundraiser for a Sri Lankan terrorist organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam, and sought to deport him to Sri Lanka. Suresh alleged he would be tortured if 
sent back to Sri Lanka, and argued that deportation in such circumstances would 
13 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 SCR 3 [Suresh]. 
14 Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2 (repealed). 
15 The relevant provisions (now repealed) were as follows:  
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any of the following classes: 
… 
(e) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe... 
(iv) are members of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe will... 
(C) engage in terrorism; 
(f) persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe... 
(ii) have engaged in terrorism, or 
(iii) are or were members of an organization that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe is or was engaged in… 
(B) terrorism, 
except persons who have satisfied the Minister that their admission 
would not be detrimental to the national interest; 
53. (1) Notwithstanding subsections 52(2) and (3), no person who is determined under this Act 
or the regulations to be a Convention refugee, nor any person who has been determined to be 
not eligible to have a claim to be a Convention refugee determined by the Refugee Division on 
the basis that the person is a person described in paragraph 46.01(1)(a), shall be removed from 
Canada to a country where the person’s life or freedom would be threatened for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion unless… 
(b) the person is a member of an inadmissible class described in paragraph 19(1)(e), 
(f), (g), (j), (k) or (l) and the Minister is of the opinion that the person constitutes a 
danger to the security of Canada; 
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violate his s 7 Charter right. The federal government acknowledged that refugees 
enjoyed s 7’s protections, and that torture is obviously a violation of the right to 
personal security (and possibly also to liberty and life), so the only issue was whether 
deportation to torture was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.16  
 
 
 In reasons attributed only to “The Court”, the Supreme Court of Canada 
reversed the course it appeared to have set in Schmidt and Kindler. More 
importantly, the Court upheld legislative provisions that permitted refoulement to 
torture and, in doing so, rendered a judgment which departed from Canada’s 
obligations under the Convention against Torture and other international human 
rights instruments. The Court’s missteps began with the following observation:  
 
Determining whether deportation to torture violates the principles of 
fundamental justice requires us to balance Canada’s interest in combatting 
[sic] terrorism and the Convention refugee’s interest in not being deported 
to torture. Canada has a legitimate and compelling interest in combatting 
[sic] terrorism. But it is also committed to fundamental justice. The notion 
of proportionality is fundamental to our constitutional system. Thus we 
must ask whether the government’s proposed response is reasonable in 
relation to the threat.17 
 
This “balancing” approach is a familiar part of the Court’s s 7 jurisprudence. 
Whatever its merits in a purely Canadian constitutional setting, it is impossible to 
reconcile with the absolute prohibition of torture, including refoulement to torture, in 
international law. 
 
 
 The Court in Suresh structures its consideration of torture around two 
“perspectives”, one Canadian and one international. While this is more a rhetorical 
device than a legal insight, it is nevertheless regrettable that the Court should depict 
the Canadian and international positions as distinct. Canada, like 153 other states in 
the world, is a party to the CAT, as well as being a party to the ICCPR and an active 
participant in the United Nations human rights system more generally. The purpose 
of multilateral treaty-making, whether in human rights or any other field, is to 
harmonize domestic legal systems around agreed-upon standards, thus eliminating 
local norms in favour of universal ones. After over 50 years of international law-
making on the subject, to which Canada has fully subscribed, there ought not to be a 
distinctly Canadian perspective on torture anymore, if (as seems doubtful) there ever 
was one in the first place. 
 
 
 Under the rubric of “The Canadian Perspective”, the Court refers briefly to 
its previous observations on torture in Schmidt and Kindler, only to conclude— 
astonishingly—that “Canadian jurisprudence does not suggest that Canada may 
16 Suresh, supra note 13 at para 44.  
17 Ibid at para 47. 
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never deport a person to face treatment elsewhere that would be unconstitutional if 
imposed by Canada directly, on Canadian soil.”18 Surely that is precisely what 
Schmidt and Kindler suggested. The Court goes on to repeat that “the appropriate 
approach is essentially one of balancing” and that the outcome of the balancing 
exercise “will depend not only on considerations inherent in the general context but 
also on considerations related to the circumstances and condition of the particular 
person whom the government seeks to expel.”19 It is difficult not to read this passage 
as a statement that refoulement to torture is permissible, under the Canadian 
perspective, where the person facing torture has earned it. The Court concludes its 
observations on the Canadian perspective with another invocation of balancing:  
 
On the one hand stands the state’s genuine interest in combatting [sic] 
terrorism, preventing Canada from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, 
and protecting public security. On the other hand stands Canada’s 
constitutional commitment to liberty and fair process. This said, Canadian 
jurisprudence suggests that this balance will usually come down against 
expelling a person to face torture elsewhere.20 
 
 
 Turning to “The International Perspective”, the Court begins by considering 
a submission by the intervener Amnesty International that the prohibition of torture 
is a rule of jus cogens, i.e., a peremptory norm of international law. The relevance of 
this submission is far from clear. Whether the prohibition of torture is a peremptory 
norm or not (and, as noted, I do not doubt that it is), it is indisputably a legal 
obligation of Canada under the Convention against Torture 1984 and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. Thus Canada (together 
with every other state party to those conventions) has an international obligation to 
observe the prohibition and give effect to it in domestic law. There was simply no 
need for the Court to consider the separate, theoretical question of whether the 
international prohibition of torture had passed beyond the status of conventional 
norm and into the lofty realm of fundamental principles of international law accepted 
by the international community of states as norms from which no derogation is 
permitted. Regrettably, Amnesty’s jus cogens submission appears to have distracted 
the Court, and possibly confused it, about the legal significance of the prohibition of 
torture in treaties to which Canada is a party. Having asked itself unnecessarily 
whether the prohibition of torture is a matter of jus cogens, the Court gave this 
beguiling answer:  
 
Although this Court is not being asked to pronounce on the status of the 
prohibition on torture in international law, the fact that such a principle is 
included in numerous multilateral instruments, that it does not form part of 
any known domestic administrative practice, and that it is considered by 
18 Ibid at para 58. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid at para 58 [emphasis added]. 
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many academics to be an emerging, if not established peremptory norm, 
suggests that it cannot be easily derogated from.21 
 
This passage betrays a misunderstanding of the concept of derogation as it relates to 
peremptory norms of international law. As conceived of in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties 1969,22 a peremptory norm of general international law is “a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Article 
53 of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty is void if, at the time of its 
conclusion, it conflicts with such a peremptory norm. The derogation referred to here 
is clearly an attempt by two or more states to vary or depart from a pre-existing 
international legal norm by treaty. Understood in this way, there can be no such thing 
as “an emerging, if not established peremptory norm…that…cannot be easily 
derogated from”, in the words of the Court in Suresh. The Court appears to be 
confusing derogation with breach; for Canada to unilaterally enact a law permitting it 
to deport suspected terrorists to face torture abroad is not a derogation from the 
international prohibition of torture, but a breach of its legal obligation to other states. 
The sense one gets from reading Suresh is that Amnesty International’s jus cogens 
submission had the unintended consequence of emboldening the Court to depart 
from Canada’s clear treaty obligation not to extradite, expel, deport, or otherwise 
return persons to states where there are substantial grounds for believing that they 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. If the prohibition of torture is not 
yet clearly jus cogens (the Court may have reasoned), we are free to leave the 
government some wiggle room.  
 
 
 Despite this bad start to the Court’s consideration of the international 
perspective on torture, it goes on to set out fully and fairly Canada’s international 
obligations relating to torture. Notably, the Court rejects the Federal Court of 
Appeal’s attempt to narrow the prohibition of refoulement in art 3(1) of the CAT, 
concluding that “the better view is that international law rejects deportation to 
torture, even where national security interests are at stake. This is the norm which 
best informs the content of the principles of fundamental justice under s 7 of the 
Charter.”23 Then comes a bewildering volte-face: having held that both the Canadian 
and international perspectives reject deportation to torture, the Supreme Court of 
Canada makes room for it in our law by the addition of unexplained and inexplicable 
qualifications of the international prohibition. I have underscored the qualifications 
below:  
 
 The Canadian rejection of torture is reflected in the international 
conventions to which Canada is a party. The Canadian and international 
perspectives in turn inform our constitutional norms. The rejection of state 
21 Ibid at para 65. 
22 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Can TS 1980 No 37. 
23 Suresh, supra note 13 at paras 66-74, 75. 
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action leading to torture generally, and deportation to torture specifically, 
is virtually categoric. Indeed, both domestic and international 
jurisprudence suggest that torture is so abhorrent that it will almost always 
be disproportionate to interests on the other side of the balance, even 
security interests. This suggests that, barring extraordinary circumstances, 
deportation to torture will generally violate the principles of fundamental 
justice protected by s. 7 of the Charter. ... 
In Canada, the balance struck by the Minister must conform to 
the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. It follows 
that insofar as the Immigration Act leaves open the possibility of 
deportation to torture, the Minister should generally decline to deport 
refugees where on the evidence there is a substantial risk of torture. 
 We do not exclude the possibility that in exceptional 
circumstances, deportation to face torture might be justified, either as a 
consequence of the balancing process mandated by s. 7 of the Charter or 
under s. 1….Insofar as Canada is unable to deport a person where there 
are substantial grounds to believe he or she would be tortured on return, 
this is not because Article 3 of the CAT directly constrains the actions of 
the Canadian government, but because the fundamental justice balance 
under s. 7 of the Charter generally precludes deportation to torture when 
applied on a case-by-case basis. We may predict that it will rarely be 
struck in favour of expulsion where there is a serious risk of torture. 
However, as the matter is one of balance, precise prediction is elusive. The 
ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must await 
future cases. 
 In these circumstances, s. 53(1)(b) does not violate s. 7 of the 
Charter. What is at issue is not the legislation, but the Minister’s 
obligation to exercise the discretion s. 53 confers in a constitutional 
manner.24  
 
None of these qualifications on the international prohibition of torture is reconcilable 
with international law. Canada and the other states parties to the CAT expressly 
rejected such qualifications in art 2(2), declaring and promising that “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political 
instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of 
torture.” 
 
 
 International reaction to Suresh was predictably negative. In a 2005 
decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, Attorney-General v Zaoui & Ors, 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s “extraordinary circumstances” formulation of the 
prohibition of torture in Suresh was referred to just long enough for both the 
government and the court to reject it. Keith J for the Court noted that the Crown had 
not pleaded such a qualification on the prohibition and that counsel for the Solicitor-
General “in argument accepted that, contrary to what was said in Suresh, the 
obligations in respect of torture and arbitrary deprivation of life were absolute.” 
24 Ibid paras 76-79. 
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Keith J added, “That position appears plainly to be the correct one….We need not 
consider that matter further.”25 
 
 
 The UN treaty body critiques of Suresh were more explicit. Unusually, the 
Committee against Torture referred to the decision by name, expressing its concern 
at “The failure of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Suresh v Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration, to recognize at the level of domestic law the absolute nature of the 
protection of article 3 of the Convention, which is not subject to any exception 
whatsoever” and “The explicit exclusion of certain categories of persons posing 
security or criminal risks from the protection against refoulement provided by the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002 [s 115(2)].”26 The Human Rights 
Committee did not refer to Suresh by name but took dead aim at the decision’s 
balancing approach. After expressing its concern with “the State party’s policy that, 
in exceptional circumstances, persons can be deported to a country where they would 
face the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which amounts to a 
grave breach of article 7 of the Covenant”, the Committee recommended that 
Canada:  
 
…recognize the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, which in no circumstances can be 
derogated from. Such treatments can never be justified on the basis of a 
balance to be found between society’s interest and the individual’s rights 
under article 7 of the Covenant. No person, without any exception, even 
those suspected of presenting a danger to national security or the safety of 
any person, and even during a state of emergency, may be deported to a 
country where he/she runs the risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The State party should clearly enact this 
principle into its law.27 
 
All the Committee is saying here, of course, is what the ICCPR and CAT already 
say. It is as though the Committee, having witnessed Canada’s failure of the torture 
test in Suresh, felt obliged to give it a remedial course in human rights law. 
 
 
 So far it seems the Supreme Court of Canada has been unfazed by 
international criticism of Suresh. In a 2007 decision, Charkaoui v Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), McLachlin CJ, for the Court, quoted Suresh for the 
proposition that “barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture will 
generally violate the principles of fundamental justice protected by s 7 of the 
Charter”, without hesitation about the legality of that proposition in international 
25 Attorney-General v Zaoui & Ors, [2005] NZSC 38 at para 16. 
26 UN Committee against Torture, Report on the Thirty-Fourth Session, 2005, Supp No 44, UN Doc 
CAT/C/CR/34/CAN at para 4; Section 115(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 
27 is effectively a re-enactment of s 53(1)(b) of the former Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2.  
27 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNOHCHR, 85th 
Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5 (2006) at para 15.  
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law.28 In a 2010 decision, Németh v Canada (Justice),29 Cromwell J gave a very 
strong judgment for the Court explaining Canada’s non-refoulement obligations in 
the extradition context, but did not engage in any reconsideration of Suresh on the 
constitutionality of the present-day enactment of s 53(1)(b) of the old Immigration 
Act, namely s 115(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.30 
 
 
KHADR (NO 2) 
 
The clearest indicator of the Court’s continuing ambivalence toward the international 
prohibition of torture came in 2010 in a case that did not concern refoulement. Omar 
Khadr was fifteen years old when taken prisoner by American forces in Afghanistan 
in mid-2002. He was charged with killing an American soldier and conspiring with 
Al Qaeda to commit acts of murder and terrorism. The US held Khadr on these 
charges, and without trial, at its prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for eight years. In 
October 2010 he was sentenced to forty years in prison after pleading guilty in a plea 
bargain that capped his remaining jail time at eight years. Khadr was finally returned 
to Canada in September 2012, the last national of a western country to be released 
from Guantanamo for the reason that Canada never sought his repatriation.  
 
 
 Khadr’s first trip to the Supreme Court of Canada, Canada (Justice) v 
Khadr,31 produced a strange decision in which settled, and seemingly correct, 
propositions about the extra-territorial application of the Charter,32 and the 
constitutional requirement that treaties be implemented in domestic law, were 
disturbed in unnecessary ways.33 The second Khadr appeal, Canada (Prime Minister) 
v Khadr,34 arose from Khadr’s legal challenge to the Canadian government’s refusal 
to seek his repatriation (prior to his guilty plea and conviction). The Prime Minister, 
Mr. Harper, had declared his intention not to seek Khadr’s repatriation during a July 
2008 interview. Khadr sought judicial review in the Federal Court before O’Reilly 
28 Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9 at para 15. 
29 Németh v Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56. 
30 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. 
31 Canada (Justice) v Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125 [Khadr (No 1)]. 
32 The disturbance of Canadian law on the extraterritorial application of the Charter in fact began with R v 
Hape, 2007 SCC 26, but Khadr’s appeal was on the Supreme Court’s docket when Hape was decided, and 
the “exception” that Khadr (No 1) purported to add to Hape was planted by the majority in Hape, 
seemingly in contemplation of the upcoming Khadr appeal: see Hape at paras 101, 113, and 186-91.  
33 Regarding Khadr (No 1) see: John H Currie, “International Human Rights Law in the Supreme Court’s 
Charter Jurisprudence: Commitment, Retrenchment and Retreat in No Particular Order” (2010) 50 Sup Ct 
L Rev (2d) 423 at 446-50. 
34 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 SCR 44 [Khadr (No 2)]. 
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J,35 alleging that the prime minister’s decision infringed his rights under s 7 of the 
Charter.  
 
 
O’Reilly J agreed and ordered the Government of Canada to request 
Khadr’s repatriation from the US authorities. O’Reilly J relied on the government’s 
admission that US authorities had subjected Khadr to a sleep deprivation regime 
known as the “frequent flyer program.” O’Reilly J explained the “frequent flyer 
program” in his reasons as a scheme to deprive Khadr of rest and sleep by moving 
him to a new location every three hours over a period of weeks. The learned judge 
quoted the following March 2004 report from the Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade:  
 
In an effort to make him more amenable and willing to talk, [blank] has 
placed [Khadr] on the “frequent flyer program.” [F]or the three weeks 
before [the] visit, [Khadr] has not been permitted more than three hours in 
any one location. At three hours interval he is moved to another cell block, 
thus denying him uninterrupted sleep and a continued change in 
neighbours. He will soon be placed in isolation for up to three weeks and 
then he will be interviewed again.36  
 
Canada admitted that its authorities knew Khadr was enduring this abuse when, in 
the spring of 2004, they interrogated Khadr (then 17) at Guantanamo. 
 
 
 O’Reilly J noted that the Supreme Court of Israel found that sleep 
deprivation for the purpose of “breaking” a suspect is unlawful,37 and that, in another 
case brought by Khadr,38 Mosley J held that the subjection of Khadr to sleep 
deprivation techniques offended the CAT. He added: 
 
In addition to its [CAT] obligation to prevent torture within Canada and to 
prosecute offenders, Canada also has a duty to “ensure that any statement 
which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be 
invoked as evidence in any proceedings” (article 15). Canada turned over 
the fruits of its interrogation of Mr. Khadr to U.S. authorities for use 
against him, knowing that sleep deprivation techniques had been imposed 
on him.39 
 
O’Reilly J also reviewed, at length, Canada’s obligations under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989,40 including those under that treaty’s Optional Protocol 
35 Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FC 405, [2010] 1 FCR 34 [Khadr 1st instance]. 
36 Ibid at para 15. 
37 Ibid at para 56. 
38 Khadr v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 807. 
39 Khadr 1st instance, supra note 35 at para 57. 
40 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can TS 1992 No 3, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) 
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on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.41 From these instruments he 
concluded as follows:  
 
Canada had a duty to protect Mr. Khadr from being subjected to any 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
from being unlawfully detained, and from being locked up for a duration 
exceeding the shortest appropriate period of time. In Mr. Khadr’s case, 
while Canada did make representations regarding his possible 
mistreatment, it also participated directly in conduct that failed to respect 
Mr. Khadr’s rights, and failed to take steps to remove him from an 
extended period of unlawful detention among adult prisoners, without 
contact with his family.  
... 
Clearly, Canada was obliged to recognize that Mr. Khadr, being a child, 
was vulnerable to being caught up in armed conflict as a result of his 
personal and social circumstances in 2002 and before. It cannot resile from 
its recognition of the need to protect minors, like Mr. Khadr, who are 
drawn into hostilities before they can apply mature judgment to the 
choices they face.42 
 
Having determined that Canada’s conduct with regard to Khadr was in repeated 
breach of its international obligations in respect of torture and other human rights, 
O’Reilly J concluded that, in the circumstances, no remedy other than an order 
requiring Canada to request Khadr’s repatriation was capable of mitigating the effect 
of the Charter violations he had suffered. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld 
O’Reilly J’s decision (Evans and Sharlow JJA.; Nadon JA. dissenting).43 
 
 
 This, then, was the case that came before the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Canada’s international legal obligations concerning torture were squarely before the 
Court. The unusually aggressive remedy directed by O’Reilly J was justified, in his 
view at least, by Canada’s breaches of the CAT and other international instruments 
relating to torture and child protection. One would have therefore expected the 
Supreme Court of Canada to tackle these issues itself. Yet if one reads the Court’s 
decision in Khadr (No 2) without also reading the judgments below, one would 
believe the international prohibition of torture was not in issue. 
 
 
 In another judgment attributed anonymously to “The Court”, the Supreme 
Court of Canada, in Khadr (No 2), not only ignored the international instruments so 
prominent in the decisions below, but studiously avoided even using the word 
“torture” in its reasons for judgment. The word appears only once in the reasons, in a 
41 Khadr 1st instance, supra note 35 at paras 58-68. 
42 Ibid at paras 64, 68. 
43 Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister), 2009 FCA 246, [2010] 1 FCR 73. 
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citation of a decision by a US military commission.44 Instead of saying that Khadr 
had been tortured (or at least subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment), the 
Court said only that Khadr’s statements to Canadian officials were obtained in 
“oppressive circumstances” and that “these conditions” and “improper treatment” 
offended “the most basic Canadian standards about the treatment of detained youth 
suspects.”45 The closest the Court came to acknowledging the treatment O’Reilly J 
regarded as contrary to the CAT was to describe the March 2004 “interview”, in 
which Khadr had refused to answer Canadian officials’ questions, as having been 
“conducted knowing that Mr. Khadr had been subjected to three weeks of scheduled 
sleep deprivation, a measure described by the U.S. Military Commission…as 
designed to ‘make [detainees] more compliant and break down their resistance to 
interrogation.’”46 
 
 
 Applying R v Hape and Khadr (No 1), the Court concluded that the Charter 
applies to the actions of Canadian officials at Guantanamo Bay, despite the supposed 
extraterritoriality problem, because the US Supreme Court has held that the 
Guantanamo regime constitutes a clear violation of fundamental human rights 
protected by international law.47 Turning, then, to Khadr’s s 7 claim, the Court held 
that it was “reasonable to infer from the uncontradicted evidence before us that the 
statements taken by Canadian officials are contributing to the continued detention of 
Mr. Khadr, thereby impacting his liberty and security interests.”48 On fundamental 
justice, the Court concluded that the statements taken by Canadian officials during 
their interrogation of Khadr were “obtained through participation in a regime which 
was known at the time to have refused detainees the right to challenge the legality of 
detention by way of habeas corpus.”49 That is quite true, but it is also a massive 
understatement of O’Reilly J’s findings and conclusions. On this basis, the Court 
concluded that Khadr’s s 7 rights had been violated. 
 
 
 Notably, the Court did not engage in any justification (s 1) analysis, but 
moved directly to the appropriateness of O’Reilly J’s remedy. The Court asked itself 
two questions: (1) Is the remedy sufficiently connected to the breach?; and (2) Is the 
remedy precluded by the fact that it touches upon the Crown prerogative over foreign 
affairs? On the first question, the Court found that Canadian officials contributed to 
Khadr’s detention by virtue of their interrogations of him at Guantanamo Bay 
“knowing Mr. Khadr was a youth, did not have access to legal counsel or habeas 
44 E.g., in United States of America v Mohammad Jawad, D-008 Ruling, “Ruling on Defense Motion to 
Dismiss—Torture of the Detainee” [emphasis added]; see Khadr (No 2), supra note 34 at para 20. 
45 Khadr (No 2), ibid at paras 20, 25, 30. 
46 Ibid at para 24. 
47 Ibid at paras 14-18. 
48 Ibid at para 21. 
49 Ibid at paras 22-26. 
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corpus at the time and, at the time of the interview in March 2004, had been 
subjected to improper treatment by the U.S. authorities.”50 The Court concluded that 
the breach of Khadr’s s 7 rights remained ongoing and that “the remedy sought could 
potentially vindicate those rights.”51 
 
 
 Where Khadr effectively lost his appeal was on the second question the 
Court put to itself. The Court affirmed its previous decisions that foreign affairs and 
other prerogative powers are not exempt from constitutional scrutiny, yet described 
its review of exercises of the prerogative power as “limited” and “narrow.”52 The 
Court then reversed O’Reilly J, saying that he had misdirected himself in exercising 
this review power. How O’Reilly J misdirected himself is left rather unclear. The 
Court complained that O’Reilly J’s remedy “gives too little weight to the 
constitutional responsibility of the executive to make decisions on matters of foreign 
affairs in the context of complex and ever-changing circumstances, taking into 
account Canada’s broader national interests.”53 But these are just words. The Court 
makes no attempt to elaborate on this indictment of O’Reilly J’s reasoning. In 
particular, we are not told what national interest Canada has that is broader than its 
interest in meeting its human rights obligations in respect of child nationals being 
detained without trial in foreign prisons.  
 
 
From here the Court passes on to a brief attempt to distinguish Khadr’s case 
from USA v Burns,54 in which the federal government was ordered not to surrender 
two young Canadian fugitives to the US without death penalty assurances. The 
difference, the Court says, is that in Khadr’s case “the likelihood that the proposed 
remedy will be effective is unclear” and “the impact of Canadian foreign relations of 
a repatriation request cannot properly be assessed by the Court.”55 How these 
considerations are at all relevant is not explained. Finally, the Court complained that 
O’Reilly J’s remedy could not be assessed against the supposedly inadequate record 
before it. The Court described the record as giving “a necessarily incomplete picture 
of the range of considerations currently faced by the government in assessing Mr. 
Khadr’s request. We do not know what negotiations may have taken place, or will 
take place, between the US and Canadian governments over the fate of Mr. Khadr.”56 
50 Ibid at para 30; Note the Court’s description of Khadr as a “youth” rather than a “child.” Khadr was a 
child for the purposes of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 40 at art 1, which defines 
“child” to mean “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to 
the child, majority is attained earlier.” 
51 Khadr (No 2), ibid at para 30. 
52 Ibid at paras 37-38. 
53 Ibid at para 39. 
54 United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 SCR 283. 
55 Khadr (No 2), supra note 34 at para 43. 
56 Ibid at para 44. 
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There is, of course, very little an applicant in a Charter case against the government 
can do to improve the record of diplomatic negotiations between Canada and foreign 
states—particularly those that have not yet occurred! The federal government 
necessarily controls the documents in such matters. By complaining about failings in 
the record on this point, the Court set an impossible, and therefore unfair, standard 
for Khadr. If there truly were any deficiencies in the record (and the courts below did 
not say so), they would be entirely attributable to the government and should not 
therefore be erected as a barrier to Charter relief.  
 
 
 The Court therefore reversed the judgment of O’Reilly J (and the majority 
of the Federal Court of Appeal) on the repatriation request, and replaced that order 
with a declaration that: 
 
…through the conduct of Canadian officials in the course of interrogations 
in 2003-2004…Canada actively participated in a process contrary to 
Canada’s international human rights obligations and contributed to Mr. 
Khadr’s ongoing detention so as to deprive him of his right to liberty and 
security of the person guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, contrary to the 
principles of fundamental justice.57 
 
Earlier in its reasons, the Court described this “remedy” as a declaration that Canada 
infringed Khadr’s s 7 rights, and “le[ft] it to the government to decide how best to 
respond to this judgment in light of current information, its responsibility for foreign 
affairs, and in conformity with the Charter.”58 I have observed elsewhere: 
 
This is like leaving the fox to decide how best to guard the henhouse. As I 
write, over a year has passed since the court made its declaration, and we 
now know the government’s response to it: deafening silence, broken only 
perhaps by muted celebration of the astonishing victory it secured over 
Khadr by means of this anaemic judgment. While the court rightly noted 
the effectiveness of declarations of unconstitutionality in general, the 
ineffectiveness of mere declaratory relief in Khadr’s case ought to have 
been abundantly obvious to the court. It did not take hindsight to see that 
the remedy fashioned for Khadr in this case would prove to be no remedy 
at all. 
 Left unstated throughout this decision is the fact that Khadr has 
been subjected to torture, or at least cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
contrary to Canadian treaty obligations and general international law. Both 
O’Reilly J and the Federal Court of Appeal gave serious consideration to 
the illegality of Khadr’s treatment at international law. Both courts 
invoked and considered the Convention against Torture and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. By contrast, the word “torture” 
appears only once in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision, and there 
only in a citation of a decision by a US military commission. Rather than 
confronting the nature and legal significance of the wrong Khadr has 
57 Ibid at para 48. 
58 Ibid at para 39. 
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suffered—at American hands but with Canadian complicity—the court 
repeatedly downplays the importance of Khadr’s mistreatment and 
emphasizes instead its own decision in Khadr No 1 to the effect that 
Guantanamo Bay is a bad place because the US Supreme Court said so. 
Khadr No 2 will ease the sleep of those Canadian politicians and 
diplomats complicit in Khadr’s nightmare, but ought to cause Canada’s 
international lawyers and human rights advocates to lose some.59 
 
 
TORTURE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
In its most recent concluding observations on Canada, the Committee against Torture 
again raised its concerns about the status of torture in Canadian law. The Committee 
noted Canada’s position “that the law allowing deportation despite a risk of torture is 
merely theoretical”, but observed that “the fact remains that it is the law in force at 
present.” The Committee declared itself “seriously concerned that…Canadian law, 
including subsection 115(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 
continues to provide legislative exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement.”60 
The word “including” in that passage was carefully chosen by the Committee, for it 
is not only the presence of s 115(2) on the statute book that is irreconcilable with our 
torture obligations. So long as Suresh remains good law in this country, our 
compliance with one of human rights’ most basic doctrines is imperfect. But Khadr 
(No 2) tells us that Canada’s torture problem is not isolated to a single legislative 
provision or a single Supreme Court judgment. There is, it seems, a deeper 
ambivalence in the Supreme Court of Canada toward recognition of, and compliance 
with, Canada’s torture obligations.  
 
 
 It is difficult to see why this should be so. The Supreme Court of Canada 
has repeatedly affirmed and applied the interpretive presumption of conformity with 
international law in the last twenty-five years. While it had previously appeared 
hesitant to adopt that same interpretive approach to Charter cases, more recent 
decisions have invoked it in the Charter context.61 Sadly, the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s torture case law undermines its credibility as a court committed to 
international law and human rights. The Court should take the next opportunity that 
presents itself to overturn Suresh, strike down s 115(2) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act, and decline to follow Khadr (No 2). Above all, the Court 
should quit treating Canada’s international human rights obligations as occasional 
59 Gib van Ert, Greg J Allen & Eileen Patel, “Canadian Cases in Public International Law in 2010-11” 
(2011) 49 Can YB of Int’l Law 512. 
60 Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Concluding 
Observations of the Committee against Torture, UNCATOR, 48th Sess, UN Doc CAT/C/CAN/CO/6, 
(2012) at para 9 [emphasis added]. 
61 E.g., R v Hape, 2007 SCC 26, [2007] 2 SCR 292 at paras 55-56; Health Services and Support-Facilities 
Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 at paras 70, 79; Divito v 
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 47, [2013] 3 SCR 157 at paras 24-27. 
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decorative features of its jurisprudence—baubles to display from time to time, but 
mostly kept out of sight. Except where the presumption of conformity with 
international law is found to be rebutted on some compelling basis, Canada’s 
international human rights obligations should be determinative of human rights cases 
before Canadian courts. That is not asking much. International human rights 
standards are not very demanding when viewed from the perspective of an advanced, 
generally rights-respecting legal system such as ours. The international prohibition of 
torture should be regarded as the least controversial, least doubtful of these 
obligations. Yet our highest court has repeatedly refused to give it effect. 
 
 
